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Abstract
In the past decade serious doubts have been expressed on the efficiency of a
strong public financial involvement in infrastructure. This provokes the question
whether financing of infrastructure should be a task of the government. For this
purpose, the paper first presents a concise theoretical overview under which
circumstances there is a case for public intervention.
Interestingly, the financing and operation of transport infrastructure has not
always been the task of the public sector. In the 19th century, the railway
infrastructure in Europe was financed and operated by the private sector. Later,
the govemment took over more and more responsibilities. This paper analyses
then for the Netherlands the reasons for the govemment to take over the
financing of infrastructure, in order to draw conclusions for the present and the
future.
Also in the 20th century many European projects have been privately financed.
In the third part of the paper an overview is presented of several projects (e.g.,
Channel Tunnel, Mont Blanc Tunnel, Dartford  Bridge, Dutch tunnels, Storebelt,
etc.) as wel1  as an analysis of the circumstances under which these are economi-
cally  successful and politically feasible.
It is concluded that the influence of governments wil1  - and should - remain
substantial because of economie,  politica1 and environmental reasons. However,
(some degree of) private financing is an interesting option for transport infra-
structure  in various cases.
1 Introduction
It is clear that there is - and should be - a large differente  in the financial
and socio-economie targets and democratie  responsibilities of the private and the
public sector. As a result,  there are several reasons for the government to
intervene in the economy  and to assume responsibility for the provision of
several goods. It may be clear that pure collective  goods (like defence) are
normally an exclusive  governmental responsibility. When the use of a good is
competitive however  (as is the case with infrastructure), this good may in
principle  be provided by the private sector as well.
The question in how far goods should be provided by the private sector may
be analyzed by using the transaction costs approach. Transaction costs include
those of e.g. negotiating, making  contracts, control and requiring information.
Within the Coase-theorem of a world without transaction costs there is no
efficiency differente  between provision by either the public or the private sector,
because negotiations continue until there is a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods
(Coase,  1988). In reality however,  there are of course many kinds of transaction
costs. A good should now be provided by that sector which can offer this good
against the lowest transaction costs. For ‘normal’  goods, provision by the private
sector wil1  usually be optimal. For some goods however,  this may not be the
case , which may justify public intervention. There are several reasons for
governments to intervene in the market (Fokkema  and Nijkamp, 1994):
* the ‘infant industry’ and ‘infant region’ argument; in an initial stage of
industrial or regional development the economie  basis of a sector or region
is too weak to be competitive and to survive, and therefore economie  actors
should be protected temporarily;
* the market failure argument; a market system does not always result  in a
Pareto-optimal allocation. There are several causes of such market failures
which may also hold for transport infrastructure:
- imperfect competition; infrastructure is an example of this situation, becau-
se it is in most cases not efficient  to operate two links on the same corri-
dor. Also the special network character of infrastructure causes imperfect
competition: one given link may contribute  to the profi@b,ility of other
links, and therefore an unprofitable link may.  be profitabie when the
impact on the total network is taken into account;
- absente of markets;  governments intervene in transport to eliminate nega-
tive extemalities or to generate  positive extemalities;
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* the ethics  and justice argument; an obvious example is the provision of non-
profitable public transport, because the government wants to provide  a
minimum mobility leve1 for everyone at reasonable fares.
However,  it seems that in recent years al1  these arguments have lost part of
their validity (Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1996). Most countries abolish support for
industries and regions, while most backward regions are already provided with
high quality infrastructure (at least in Western-Europe). At the same time,  there
is competition of other modes, while for example for highways there is a huge
underlying network avaiiable. Negative extemalities are more and more coped
with in a market-based way, while new teclmologies make levying tolls  much
cheaper (e.g., road pricing technologies). Also for the provision of public tran-
sport, market incentives are introduced  and competition between market parties
is increasingly allowed. At the same time  it is widely acknowledged that provi-
sion by the public sector also causes costs  - the so-called governrnent failures -
because this makes provision of goods more inefficient  and is largely influenced
by e.g. pressure groups.
It may be concluded that there are stil1 various reasons for governments to
intervene in the transport sector, especially for environmental reasons and in
order to integrate markets by constructing infrastructure. However,  the perceived
necessity for govemments to intervene has clearly been reduced. At the same
time  govemment budgets are stil1 tight, while most govemments want to increase
investments in transport infrastructure (the Trans-European Networks, High
Speed Train networks, conventional rail and road infrastructure, etc.) in order to
solve congestion problems and to stimulate economie  growth. As a result  private
financing of transport infrastructure may be an interesting option.
In this paper it wil1  be analysed whether and under which conditions the
private sector is able and prepared to finance transport infrastructure. The paper
is built up as follows. In Section 2 a concise theoretical overview wil1  be pres-
ented on the financing of transport infrastructure; also conditions wil1  be
identified which should be met when a concession is granted. Next, the financing
of Dutch infrastructure in the 19th century  wil1  be discussed  in Section 3 and wil1
be confronted with the conditions found in Section 2. The same holds for the
analysis in Section 4, which contains a cross-European overview of various
privately financed projects. In Section 5 conclusions wil1  be drawn.
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2 Private Financing of Infrastructure; a Theoretical Overview
2.1 Characteristics of investments in infrastructure
Investments in infrastructure may differ from competing investments such as
immovables and capita1 goods in several ways (Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995).
Especially the high investment costs and the long construction and planning
periods may make an investment very unattractive for a private investor, because
in the beginning of a project a lot of capita1 is needed, while the pay-back period
is very long. As a result  the interest costs are very high at the beginning of a
project, while the cash-flow and the return on investments are low. In most cases
there are no revenues  at al1  before the operation starts. When it starts, the
profits tend to increase over time, because more repayments are made, which
reduce the interest costs. The problem is that these high profits and revenues
often start decades after  the initial investment, which make the uncertainty and
the risks of infrastructure projects very high.
In practice  however,  it is very wel1  possible that there is no profit  at al1  (Nij-
kamp and Rienstra, 1995). The construction costs of infrastructure are (up to a
certain leve1 of demand/transport) fixed costs; the other costs are partly fixed
and partly variable. From this it follows that compared to competing investments
fixed costs in infrastructure are very high for an investor, while variable and
marginal costs are relatively low. When the price in this case is set according to
the marginal costs, it is often not possible to make a satisfactory return on
investment .
2.2 Risks of investments in infrastructure
Risks are included in al1 kinds of investments, but for investments in
infrastructure these are particularly high. This is the result  of the long pay-back
period, which makes it difficult to make good estimations of revenues  (ECMT,
1990).
The politica1 risks are the most important differente  compared to altemative
investments, however.  In practice,  govemments always wish to influence the
planning of infrastructure, because of the important positive and negative
extemal effects  and the national importante  of high quality infrastructure. There
is always also a danger of changes  in laws or new regulations or even of
nationalisation, since a change in transport policy may influence  the charges
which can be asked as wel1  as the competition by other modes.
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The expected costs and revenues  are of course important for the calculation
of the return on investments. It appears to be very difficult to estimate the costs
of construction of major infrastructure projects, however. Therefore, the projects
are often much more expensive than estimated beforehand. This problem arises
especially when the project is a completely new transport mode or when new
technologies  are used. Then many costs are not known at the outset of the
project and the estimates appear to be too low in almost  al1  cases.
Another important cause  of rising costs are relatively expensive solutions,
chosen to cape with resistance in society, e.g., to avoid external effects  (this may
lead e . g . , to (half-)subterranean infrastructure and noise-shields). It is however,
very important that the tost  estimates are made on a reliable basis; otherwise, it
wil1  be impossible to assess the economie  viability of the project. And if no
return on investment can be calculated, private investors might withdraw.
In conclusion, the risks of infrastructure investments are very high compared
Co alternative investment opportunities; this in turn makes these investments
unattractive for private investors.
2.3 A classification of private involvement
Private involvement in infrastructure provision may occur in several ways. It
is useful  to make a clear distinction between financing  and operation of infra-
structure.  The possible ways of infrastructure are indicated in Figure 1,  although
in practice  the distinction may sometimes be less straightforward.
fïnancing
Private Public
Private 1 1 1
operation
Public 1 1 1 IV
Figure 1  DifSerent  focus of public-private sector involvement
Source Nijkamp and Rienstra (1995)
The first category (1) refers to a situation where infrastructure is regarded as
a normal  good with normal market prices. There is no public intervention. The
airline sector in the US is an example of this situation.  As seen in Section 1, this
situation may in economie  terms not be optimal in various cases.
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In the second  category (11) the infrastructure wil1  be efficiently operated,
while the government only has to pay  the fixed infrastructure costs and not the
variable operating costs.
The next category (111) concerns a situation where the private sector finances
the infrastructure, but where the public sector is charged with the operating
costs.
Finally , category IV is a common situation in conventional road and water-
way infrastructure. Financing and operation are under control of the government.
It is clear  that most economie  benefits may be found in the operation of the
infrastructure, and therefore government policy should aim at achieving this. The
financing however,  may as a consequente  (partly) be private, when the expected
operational profits are high enough.
As argued by Nijkamp and Rienstra (1995),  two conditions have to be met
for private financing possibilities:
* the private investor should take the risks of the investment (at least to a
large extent);
* user charges should be levied.
The first condition  is, for example, not met when the govemment provides
guarantees for the pay-back of loans. When the govemment guarantees loans, it
runs the risks instead of the private investor, while possible additional revenues
are handed over to the private investor. In this way there are also less incentives
to provide  the infrastructure efficiently. In conclusion, such a model is not eco-
nomically feasible and is therefore in the long run unattractive for govemments.
Next, levying user charges, e.g. by introducing tol1  or road pricing, is also a
necessary condition. An altemative is that the govemment compensates  the
investor from the public budget, e.g. by providing a revenue per passing car. In
this case however,  the govemment accepts  long term obligations, while the
private investor wil1  ask a considerable  risk premium. Therefore, the costs for
the government wil1  be much  higher  than with public financing, while the govem-
ment stil1 pays for the project out of the public budget. From this argumentation,
it may be concluded that private financing is only feasible when there are
considerable  revenues  from user charges. Private operation and management is
therefore a sine qua non for private financing, whiIe this relationship does not
hold in the opposite direction.
As a result,  concessions in Category 111 of Figure 1 are not economically
useful. However,  such constructions may politically be very attractive,  because
the funding  of the investment can be postponed, while the public control over
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the infrastructure is not reduced. In the end however,  such a construction is
more expensive for governments, because the interest rates  for private financiers
are higher,  while there are no efficiency gains in the operation. Therefore, such a
construction is more expensive for governments.
2.4 Public private cooperation
It may be clear that in theory transport infrastructure may be provided by
the private sector. In practice however,  the influence of governments tends  to be
high, not only because of the strategie  importante  and the specific  characteristics
of infrastructure, but also because of various environmental and equity issues
involved. As a result,  private financing and operation in practice faces many
problems. Therefore, joint ventures may be an interesting option by combining
the advantages of both regimes. In such joint undertakings the above mentioned
conditions should of course be met, while market incentives should be intro-
duced to a maximum extent in order to achieve  an efficient  management and to
reduce the transaction costs of infrastructure provision.
In many cases private sector’ involvement tends  to be introduced  by franchis-
ing (Andersen, 1995; Nash, 1993). A franchise can be defined as a contract
between a transport authority (the franchiser)  and a private company (the
franchisee),  by which the latter obtains  the right to operate  a transport system.
Under a conventional franchise contract, the franchisee  pays the franchiser  for
using his property rights. In the case of transport infrastructure, this situation
may be reversed: the transport authority may compensate  the private company
for an expected operational deficit. These franchise contracts  may be allocated
by means  of tendering. There may be two different kinds of contracts:  a given
transport system is transferred to the company which offers to operate  it at the
lowest costs or the contract is transferred to the company which offers the best
transport system for a given budget.
Next we wil1  discuss  private involvement in practice, in order to analyze to
which extent the conditions and observations in this Section  hold. First in Section
3, the Dutch transport infrastructure financing in the 19th century wil1  be
discussed.  Section  4 focuses  on major European projects.
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3 A Historica1 Sketch of the Netherlands in the 19th Century
In this section a short historica1 sketch of the ways various transport infra-
structure  modes in the Netherlands have been financed wil1  be presented. We
wil1  deal with waterways, railways and roads, respectively.
3.1 Waterways
Inland  waterways have traditionally been one of the most important trans-
port activities in the Netherlands. Not only the rivers, but also man-made canals
formed an essential part of Dutch transport infrastructure. In particular, the
horse drawn barges were important vehicles for both passengers and goods
(Vries, 1981). The construction of canals started already in the seventeenth
century and continued  until the beginning  of this century.
The canals were mainly financed by the cities, connected by these waterways.
These cities created special societies aiming  at commercial use of the canals.
This decentralized system was mainly based on a tol1  system, so that at the end
the user had to pay for it. Given the high profitability of many canals, various
cities were very keen on expanding the inland  waterways system. The operation
of the canals was usually a joint responsibility of shippers’ associations (guilds).
In the nineteenth century the construction of large canals started. In the
beginning these canals were financed and operated by private companies,  while
the govemment granted concessions. Also govemments participated in these
companies.  The number of large canals constructed however,  was rather  limited.
Therefore, the centra1 govemment started to finance the canals. Especially King
Willem 1 was pushing  the construction of these canals, which were sometimes
even partly financed by his own private capital.  He also sometimes provided
capita1 without informing  the parliament, which was often opposing the large
investments. Later on, the centra1 govemment financed more and more canals
and the involvement of the private sector reduced (Tijn and Zappey, 1979). In
1868 the Mannheim Treaty was signed with the ether  Rhine  countries. According
to this treaty it was forbidden to levy tolls  and to discriminate  shippers of ether
countries; this holds also for canals linked to the Rhine. As a result,  private
financing of most canals was not possible anymore for most canals. In practice,
only regional canal networks were stil1  privately financed.
In the  twentieth century the centra1 govemment became the only financier
of new infrastructure. The tol1  systems were gradually abolished, and most smal1
regional canals were closed or remained only open for recreational purposes.
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3.2 Railways
Since 1830, the development of railways led to a new phase in the evolution
of modern infrastructure in the Netherlands. Three stages can be identified in
the private sector involvement in the railways.
The jïrst  stage (1830-1860)
In the first stage (until 1860) al1 railways were developed on a private-
commercial basis (Category 1 of Figure 1). The government did not consider it as
a public responsibility to provide  railway services, although the govemment had
to give concessions and also gave support by confiscating land. Initially, the
railway companies had to give financial compensations to horse-drawn barges
and carriages in order to reduce resistance of competing interest parties. Two
large and several smal1 privately owned companies came into existente.  The
most profitable links - which were constructed near the most profitable water-
ways - were opened in this period (Jonkers Nieboer, 1938). Interestingly, in the
concession granted by the govemment it was stated that third parties could use
the infrastructure when a user fee was paid; nowadays this possibility is again an
often mentioned option. Also maximum tariffs were controlled  by the govem-
ment. In general,  it appeared that the profits of the companies were relatively
low.
The second  stage (1860-1890)
The construction of links largely stopped when the most profitable links
were constructed. Therefore, the public involvement increased in the second
stage (1860-  1890),  also because the equity objective  started to play an important
role; various cities were not connected to the new railway infrastructure as such
links were not commercially feasible. The development of the railways was also
lagging  behind the development in other European countries, where  the con-
struction of new railways was much more supported by the govemments.
Therefore, in this new stage the govemment took upon  itself the responsibility to
build expansions of the railway system for less  profitable  sections. The exploita-
tion  of these new links rested however  stil1 with private companies (sometimes
subsidized by the govemment). This situation corresponds with Category IV in
Figure 1.  Interestingly, this way of operation is now proposed by the EU and
several countries as the new regime, under which the railway companies should
operate.  In this period the railway network was expanded very fast: in 1860 there
was 339 km of infrastructure, in 1889 this increased to 2620 km (Bierman  et al.,
1982). In general,  the network was in 1890 about the same as today .
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The third stage (1890-1940)
More and more problems occurred because of the segmented operation of
the network. At the same time  the network was expanded with many local
railway links, which were not profitable (these were mostly closed a few decennia
later). To cape with these problems, the govemment forced the companies in the
next stage (1890-1940) to integrate the network, in order to benefit  from network
synergy. First, two companies were left, which only competed in the densely
populated West of the country. This system was not working very well, and
therefore one national railway company (the Dutch Railways) was created in the
end which had a monopoly position, but at the same time  the company had a
duty for operating and transport on al1  designated links of the network. This
social equity objective  meant in practice that it became almost  impossible to
operate the railway system on a commercial basis. Therefore, the government
became increasingly involved in this company and covered the loss and
guaranteed loans.
The post-war stage
In the post-war stage the Dutch Railways participated also in regional bus
transport. Because the company started at a financially healthy basis in 1945, the
company was able to operate the network in a profitable way. Gradually
however,  the company entered a stage of structural deficits which were covered
by the govemment. Since 1985 the Dutch Railways have to operate with a fixed
budget established annually a priori by the govemment. New infrastructure  is
financed à fonds perdu by the govemment, while maintenance and depreciation
are financed by the Dutch Railways.
In recent years, there is increasing pressure to have again a commercial
exploitation of the railway system (including financing on the open capita1
market). Therefore, the govemment has decided to stop subsidizing the oper-
ation  of infrastructure,  although per link subsidies might be given by contract.
The infrastructure  wil1  become the responsibility of the government; therefore,
the government wil1  finance and maintain the infrastructure. The railway
company wil1  have to pay a user charge when the profïtability  becomes sufficient.
3.3 Roads
As mentioned above, horse drawn carriages and later on automobiles made
up the main  vehicles on road infrastructure. The strong competition between
various types of transport led at the end to a winning  position of the private car.
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The drastic  expansion of road infrastructure parallelled  this growth of private
transport.
Drastic  investments in road infrastructure started essentially at the beginning
of this century (Bierman  et al., 1982). The government took the responsibility to
finance road infrastructure, the revenues  were mainly collected  from road taxes,
vehicle taxes and genera1 taxes. Private financing of roads has never become a
major activity; only a few bridges and tunnels have been privately financed and
operated, although in recent years there is an increasing tendency to expand the
number of privately financed infrastructural options (see Section 4).
3.4 Concluding remarks
The operation and financing of infrastructure can be analyzed by applying
the analysis of Section 2.3 (see Table 1).
Table 1 Features of the jïnancing and operation of Dutch infrastructure
Private Private Risks for User charges ’
operation f i n a n c i n g private sector
Waterways
* before 1800 +/- +
* 1800-18502 + +/- +/- +
* after  1850
Railways
* before 1860 + + + +
* 1860-1890 + + +
* 1890-1948 - k J - +/- +/-
* 1948-1994 +/-
* after  19943 + + +/-
Roads
Note: 1) In the case of railways user charges paid by the railway companies  are meant.
2) Differs per project; the main case is presented.
3) This presents the situation as proposed; the system is not entirely introduced  yet.
It appears that the role of the govemment has been fluctuating between
abstention, dominant involvement and encouragement of private initiatives. A
similar pattern is for example also found in the UK (Banister et al., 1995).
Apparently, the policy life cycle of infrastructure financing in the Netherlands is
following the budget cycle, This means  that the gradual decline of private
infrastructural initiatives may soon turn into a greater impact of the private
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sector on financing and operation of various infrastructure modes. An other inte-
resting observation is that the railway infrastructure is operated in the most
commercial way, while the road infrastructure always has been the responsibility
of the public sector. A main  reason for this may be that the number of vehicles
on the railway infrastructure is limited, which makes levy ing charges cheaper and
easier. However,  this situation may give the railways a competitive  disadvantage
vis-à-vis competing modes.
It appears that private financing of infrastructure occurred only in the first
stage of railway construction and partly in the beginning of the large waterway
projects. When this occurred, the conditions of Section 2.3 are met; the private
sector ran sufficient  risks and user charges were levied to cover the costs of the
investment.
Interestingly, financing and operation schemes of the nineteenth century are
proposed nowadays in several countries. This holds especially for the railways,
where several types of concessions have been applied. It may be very useful to
leam from the experiences of the past.
4 A Cross-European Overview of Privately Financed Projects
Since 1945 almost  al1 European transport infrastructure has been financed
and operated by govemments or by public organisations tied to the govemment.
Especially in the case of railways, there is at present a trend to separate the
financing and operation of infrastructure, as is the case in Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom  (Category 11 in Figure 1) (Hannson and Nilsson, 1991;
Nash, 1993). In this model, the management and financing of infrastructure is
the responsibility of the govemment, while the operation takes place on a private
basis, where  the operator imposes user charges. In this situation there may be
several suppliers of transport services, which allows competition. This model
corresponds to recent EU regulations and is proposed or under discussion in
several countries (Germany, Italy , Netherlands). In the UK, there are also plans
to privatise the rail infrastructure owner (Railtrack).
Road infrastructure is mostly the responsibility of the public sector however,
although there are in several countries discussions about introducing tol1  or road-
pricing systems. In Sweden the official policy aims at introducing the same
construction for road infrastructure as for rail infrasttucture (Hannson and
Nilsson, 1991). Because of the above-discussed Mannheim treaty, also waterways
have been f’inanced by the public sector.
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However, there are several projects which have been financed and/or
operated by the private sector. In this section an overview wil1  be presented of
several major projects which have (partly) been financed and operated by the
private sector. The description wil1  focus on the concession and financing
arrangements and not on exact figures.
The Channel Tunnel
The Channel Tunnel is the first fixed link between France and the UK,
which was opened in 1994 (Marcou, 1993; Vickerrnan, 1995). The tunnel is only
meant for trains, which also transport cars. The Channel tunnel has been
financed entirely by private financiers and the Channel tunnel is one of the few
projects which is for a large part financed by stocks; most projects are (almost)
entirely financed by loans. The concession is granted for 55 years, while in the
concession it is stated that until 2020 no other fixed links wil1  be constructed; in
this way there wil1  be no new competitors. Both the French and British govern-
ments have no influence on the tariffs, so the operator is free in setting the
tariffs. The railway companies have granted the use of at least 50% of the
capacity of the tunnel, however:  Also the infrastructure  to and from the tunnel
has been or wil1  be financed by govemments or the railway companies.
The costs of the tunnel were much larger than expected, and as a result  the
Eurotunnel  company bas  serious financial problems. Also the construction took
longer  than expected, which again increased the interest and ether  costs.
Although the concession and financing have been the responsibility of the
private sector, the support (also financial) of both the French and British
government has been large (Marcou, 1993).
The Great Belt link and Oresund link
The Great Belt link is the fixed link in Denmark  between Seeland and
Jutland, it wil1  be both a road and a rail link. The rail link wil1  be ready first, so
that the railways wil1  be able to gain a large market share. The link is financed
entirely by loans, which are granted by the govemrnent (Kolk et al., 1991),  so
that in the end the govemment runs  the financial risks. The govemment also
owns the company which finances  and operates the links. It is planned  that the
road link is paid back in 15 years (by tolls); the rail link should be paid back in
30 years. However,  there have been serious delays during the construction,  and
as a result  also the costs have become much  higher  than expected. Therefore,
the time  between opening of the rail and road link is shorter  and the pay-back
periods may be larger as expected beforehand.
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ventures of governments and private parties. The government does not guarantee
al1  loans of the SEM’s, but the influence of the government is large. For
example, the tolls, losses and profits are equalized and redistributed by a
holding. As a result  the risks are not very high for the private financiers. In the
196Os,  there were several entirely private companies  operating the highways;
however,  these turned into SEM’s except one: the Cofiroute is stil1 operated by a
private company, although it is partly subsidized by the government. The project
was very profitable; however,  the French government obliged the company to
reinvest  these profits in new infrastructure. As a result,  the company runs at a
loss (Banister et al., 1995).
Dutch Tunnels
In the Netherlands the Tunnel under the Noord (near Rotterdam) has been
opened in 1982. This tunnel has been financed for f300  mln (which is about
60%) by private financiers, while the government financed the remainder. In this
way the govemment ran the construction risks of higher  ccsts and delays. Also
the ‘competing’ bridge over the North was included in the agreement. When the
contracts  were signed, an electtonic road pricing system was planned in the
Dutch Randstad; therefore, the consortium should receive  the fees of the tunnel
and the bridge. However,  these plans were postponed so that the govemment
pays now a fee out of the government budget to the consortium per passing
vehicle.
For a second tunnel (Wijkertunnel near Amsterdam) an contract with about
the same conditions has been signed. Recently, it appeared that this financing
construction is very expensive for the govemment in the long run. As a result
this way of financing is not expected to be applied for other projects.
4.3 Concluding remarks
The main  characteristics are summarized in Table 2. Striking is that al1
projects in the UK are entirely privately financed and operated. In the other
countries the govemment influence is larger. Striking is that the Dutch tunnels
are the only projects which are not levying user charges to the car drivers. The
conditions for economically useful  projects are therefore not met for the Dutch
tunnels, the Great Belt link and the SEM’s in France.
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An equal project has been started for the Oresund link between Denmark
and Sweden. The conditions are about equal to the Great Belt link, the loans
are granted by the Danish and Swedish government.
The Mont Blanc tunnel
The Mont Blanc tunnel is a road link between France and Italy and was
opened in 1966. The tunnel has several stakeholders; about 70% of the French
company and 50% of the Italian company is owned by national, regional and
local govemments, while the remainder is owned by private financiers. The
concession period is 70 years; the tolls are regulated by the government. Because
of the large unexpected mobility growth, the tunnel was very profitable, although
the tunnel was twice as expensive as expected. Because of the large profits, the
government forced the consortium to finance a second  tunnel (the Fréjus-tunnel)
and to finance the infrastructure  from and to the tunnel. This reduced the
profitability. Despite this, al1 loans were paid back in 1982 and the tunnel is very
profitable for the financiers (ECMT, 1990).
The Dartford  Bridge
The Dartford  Bridge is the tunnel over the Thames and is next to two
tunnels the third main  link on the route. In the concession agreement also the
operation of these two tunnels has been included. The concession is granted for
20 years; however, when the loans are paid back earlier, the bridge wil1  be
handed over to the govemment, so that ‘excessive  profits’ are not possible. The
bridge is entirely financed by private capital. An equal construction has been
applied for the Second  Sevem Crossing bridge between Wales and Southem
England  (ECMT, 1990).
The Birmingham Northern Relief  Road (BNRR)
The BNRR is the first road in the UK to be financed and operated private-
ly, without any guarantees of the govemment. It wil1  also be the first  tolled
highway in the UK. The company is allowed to set the tolls without approval of
the govemment. This is justified by the govemment because the competing roads
wil1  stay tol1  free, which reduces the freedom of the operator. The concession is
granted for 53 years (Banister et al., 1995).
French Highways
Levying tolls in combination with private financing is usual in France. Most
infrastructure  is financed by Société d’ Economie Mixtes  (SEM), which are joint
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Table 2 Features of the financing and operation of European  infrastructure projects
Private Private Risks for User
operation financing private sector charges
Channel tunnel + + + +
Great Belt link +/-  ’ + +
Mont Blanc tunnel +/-  ’ +-l-? + +
Dartford  Bridge + + + +
BNRR + + + +
French Highways
* SEM’s +/-  ’ + +/- +
* Cofiroute + + + +
Dutch tunnels + +/-2 +
. ..-.“. 1, Tl., ..,,:,,r :..  ,..,..,r,.A  l... - :,:..r .*.......-_1, 1‘Ic;  p‘“JGLL ‘3 “pG‘cíLE;u vy d ,“LI’L-Yu,L”‘c.
2) The project is financed only pmly  by private capital.
Several characteristics of these above discussed projects can be identified:
most projects are ‘missing links’ in a network (Channel Tunnel, Mont Blanc
bridge) and as a result  there is a kind of monopoly position, which guaran-
tees a certain leve1 of demand. When this is not the case, a monopoly
position is often created by contract (Dartford Bridge, Tunnel under the
Noord; for the Channel tunnel it is stated that competing links wil1  not be
constructed until 2020);
the private financiers receive  mostly guarantees of the govemment for loans.
For the Dutch tunnels the government took over even the construction risks;
many projects are more expensive than expected, also because the construc-
tion  time  is longer  than estimated beforehand;
the politica1 risk is often reduced, for example, because the govemments
participate  in the consortia. Often the projects are linking two countries,
which makes it more difficult for one of the govemments to interfere.
the influence of governments is stil1 large in al1 projects.
It can be concluded that most infrastructure is stil1 financed and operated by
govemments, while - except maybe the United Kingdom  - the influence on
privately financed and operated projects is stil1 large.
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5 Conclusions
The interests of the private sector clearly differ from that of the public
sector. As a result,  transport infrastructure is not a good which can be easily
provided by the private sector. Governments have several reasons to take the
responsibility and have influence on the provision of infrastructnre in order to
secure equity objectives (e. g . , isolated regions or mobility-deprived people), to
reduce negative external effects and to achieve positive extemal effects. How-
ever, there are reasons to consider private financing and operation of infrastruc-
ture :
* the private sector may provide, construct and maintain the infrastructure
more efficient;
* the acceptance of user charges may be higher,  because a private company is
the owner;
* it reduces govemment expenditnres and may in this way help to achieve
financial policy objectives; in this way the project may also be constructed
earlier .
From the historica1 analysis in the Netherlands it becomes clear  that entirely
private provision is not feasible. Networks wil1  not come into existente,  because
several links are not profitable or too risky for private financiers. Therefore, the
generation of network synergy wil1  be more difficult, especially when there are
several suppliers. Interestingly, certain operational and financing constructions
which are currently under discussion in several European countries for the
railways have been applied in the Netherlands in the past. Shifts in societal views
on the importante, effectiveness and acceptance of market incentives appear to
change over time;  therefore, in the 1960s and 1970s the govemment took most
responsibility for the operation and financing of railway infrastructure. In recent
years however,  the earlier applied constructions seem to be introduced  once
again. It should be acknowledged that these views are in the first place import-
ant for the private operation of infrastructure projects.
Private financing - which is only  feasible when the private operation gener-
ates  sufficient  income  - seems nowadays only possible for specific  projects,  since
the most profitable links are already constructed. The govemment wil1  - and
should - be largely involved- in these projects however,  because of the above
mentioned reasons. Problems are fust found in the estimation of the construc-
tion costs and the construction time.  It is striking that in almost  al1 discussed
projects these estimations were wrong, so that the costs were much  higher  ‘as
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expected beforehand. Governments should reduce especially politica1 risks to a
maximum extent, for example, by clear clauses in the concession agreement.
However,  an important condition  is that the government does not take over al1
risks, otherwise the project becomes only more expensive for governments in the
long run while there are no efficiency gains.
In conclusion, when certain conditions are met, private financing of transport
infrastructure  may be an attractive  altemative for conventional public funding.
Private financing may in this way contribute  to the efficiency and productivity of
an economy  .
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